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Abstract
This paper investigates whether the deal premium affects the performance of the acquiring
firms in European mergers and acquisitions (M&As) deals for the period 2000-2013. We find
a significant reduction in short-term performance of the acquiring firms after the M&As,
reflecting the overpayment hypothesis. Our result also indicates that the negative effect on the
performance of the acquiring firms is less pronounced in the long-term. The result confirms
the synergy hypothesis and the existence of quadratic relationship between high premium and
performance. Our findings are robust as we control for firm and time trends. The findings of
our study have implications for companies engaging in acquisitions in Europe.
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1. Introduction
The 2010s produced the greatest wave of mergers in global history. According to the Dealogic
(2016) financial data, global mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have grown substantially in
size, frequency, and strategic importance from below $20 billion in 1967 to about $5.05 trillion
in 2015. Several reasons highlight the motives behind M&A deals. These include growth
opportunities (Harrison, Hitt and Ireland, 2001), gaining value in response to regime shifts in
an industry (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1986), managerial hubris (Roll, 1986), defensive tactic
(Gorton, Kahl and Rosen, 2009), a means to take advantage of market misvaluation (Shleifer
and Vishny, 2003), bankruptcy avoidance, increase diversification, and synergy (Halpern,
1983; Haleblian et al., 2009). Bower (2001) puts forth five reasons for acquisition decisions as:
2(1) reducing overcapacity in mature industries, (2) achieving economies of scale and scope
through geographic roll-ups, (3) expanding new products or market power, (4) standing-in for
research and development, and (5) inventing an industry by culling resources from industries
whose boundaries are disappearing.
Whatever the motives behind the managers’ actions, there is no consensus about the post-
acquisition performance of the merging firms as there are different contrasting results. Some
studies provide evidence of significant negative returns for the acquiring firms (e.g., Kennedy
and Limmick, 1996; Rau and Vermaelen, 1998; Fuller et al., 2002 and Moeller et al., 2005), as
well as negative long run post-acquisition performance (Agrawal and Jaffe, 2000). Other
studies (e.g., Franks et al., 1991) do not find significant underperformance post-acquisition.
Antoniou et al. (2008) for example, examine the impact of premiums on the post-acquisition
performance but find no evidence that high premium paying companies underperformed low
premium paying ones in the three-years following the deal. Another stand of the M&As
literature shows the positive abnormal returns on these deals post-acquisition (e.g., Humphery-
Jenner and Powell, 2011), and Mulherin and Boone (2000) report a positive synergistic wealth
effects after the acquisition. Similarly, Savor and Lu (2009) provide evidence that companies
who successfully consummate a deal perform better than those who fail to do so.
Extant literature suggests that merger premiums are often overpaid (e.g., Schwert, 1996;
Agrawal and Jaffe, 2000; Dong et al, 2006; Eckbo, 2009). For the target firms, the
overwhelming evidence suggests that, on average, they earn positive abnormal returns in post
M&A deals (Datta, et al., 1992; Hansen and Lott, 1996; Chari et al., 2012, Goddard et al.,
2012). This is largely attributable to the premiums received as part of the merger transaction.
However, for the acquiring firms, the evidence is rooted within the contrasting literature of
negative abnormal returns, non-significant underperformance and positive abnormal returns
(see for example, Moeller et al., 2004; Antoniou et al., 2008; Savor and Lu, 2009). Given these
trade-offs, the benefits of M&A are not obvious. As a result, the association between premium
and performance is largely an empirical matter. To provide evidence, the present study
examines the relation between premiums paid and the short-term post-merger performances of
acquiring firms in the EU.
We also analyse the effect of the takeover on the long-term post-merger performances of
acquiring firms in the EU. Majority of the studies that examine merger premium and firm value
focus mainly on the US and UK based firms. Given the global relevance of the EU and the
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this regard (see Papadakis, and Thanos, 2010). Consequently, the study of the impact of the
EU M&A deals will offer rich insights on the effect of M&A on post-acquisition performance
of the acquiring firms.
Our study is underpinned by two hypotheses, namely the overpayment and the synergy
hypotheses. The first hypothesis posits that high premium paid during acquisitions is
responsible for the subsequent underperformance of firms (e.g., Sung, 1993; Schwert, 2003).
The theory hinges on the fact that high premiums could force managers to create impossible
targets to justify the price paid for the target. If the expected targets are not met, then the
takeover consequently destroys value. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that managers
overpay for the target firms for their personal benefits; and Roll (1986) conjectures that
managers’ motivated by hubris tend to overpay for targets. The second hypothesis posits that
the premium paid is a signal of the synergies expected (e.g., Harrison et al., 1991; Palia, 1993;
Fu et al., 2013). The hypothesis argues that managers will pay higher premium for higher
synergy values.
This paper contributes to extant literature by providing a comprehensive evidence of the effects
of M&A deals on short- and long-term performance of firms in the EU. In doing so, we control
for deals, firm and country level characteristics that could influence the size of the premium
offered in a deal. Our study differs substantially from existing studies. For example, Antoniou
et al (2008) examine the difference in the performance of large versus low premium UK firms
between 1984-2004 while our study focuses on large EU mergers and uses the Carhart four-
factor model to capture the momentum factor which is the earning premium of the acquirers.
The momentum factor enables us to estimate the Alpha of the post deal completions for up to
60 months. We provide empirical evidence with more recent data of 2000-2013 on the impact
of premium on short and long term performance by evaluating the existence of quadratic
relationship between high premium and performance. Finally, our study also estimates the
point of inflection between which the synergy hypothesis becomes effective.
Our results show a significant negative influence of the premium on the abnormal returns,
supporting overpayment hypothesis (Grullon et al., 1997). The result suggests that the
acquiring firms are paying higher premium on targets firms, higher than market participants’
expectation, suggesting that the acquisitions are value destroying. Our findings also show that
4the quadratic relation predict that the market expects a value creating acquisition will command
a higher premium, around two times the average premium - reflecting a synergy effect.
Further, our empirical results suggest that, indeed, the long-term performance of the acquisition
is negative to the acquirers. Our results adds to the growing literature on long-term post-
acquisition underperformance of the bidder (e.g., Agrawal et al., 1992; Limmack, 1991;
Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Rau and Vermaelen, 1998) by showing that the long-term takeover
effect of EU firms are not value adding. In this regard, we contribute to the broader literature
on the long-term performance of mergers (e.g., Rau and Vermaelen, 1998).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 is literature review and the development
of the research hypotheses; Section 3 is the description of data and research models. Section 4
discusses the empirical tests and results of the study, and Sections 5 is conclusion.
2. Literature review and hypotheses development
The popularity of the performance of corporate acquisitions is increasing especially since the
1980s. As a result, the economic value of the acquisition for the acquiring firm has been the
subject of interest to a significant number of practitioners and academia from different fields
(Roll, 1986; Varian, 1988; Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003; Zollo and Meier, 2008; Cho et al.,
2016). Due to the complexity of the M&As process (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999), there is
no agreement on the approach to be used on measuring the acquisition success; whether by the
long-term event or the short-horizon event windows (Javidan et al., 2004). Zollo and Meier
(2008) review 88 articles of the M&A literature published between 1970 and 2006 and find
that 41% of the papers use the short-term approach while 28% adopt the long-term
methodological approach. According to MacKinlay (1997), short-term event studies reduce the
effect of confounding events and are robust to different model specifications while Healy et al.
(1992) document that they correlate with long-term performance measures. On the other hand,
Zollo and Meier (2008) find no significant relation between the short-term event and other
approaches. Clearly, the conflicting findings motivate us to use both the short-term and the
long-term approach to analyse the effect of acquisition premiums on performance.
2.1 Hypothesis development
Several researchers have attempted to document the evidence of the gains of M&As for the
acquiring firms. For example, Nathan and O’Keefe (1989) provide empirical evidence that
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measured by the S&P index. Schwert (1996) in his study of 1,814 deals of US firms finds a
correlation between the level of run-up in the target firm’s share price pre-bid announcement
and the level of the premium paid. In a more recent study, Madura et al. (2012) find evidence
of a positive relationship between industry and macroeconomic factors and premiums paid.
They show that the level of the premium is directly proportional to the level of growth of an
industry, the capital liquidity present and the level of volatility.
The perception of managers of the level of synergy benefits from takeovers, whether in the
short and long-terms, will determine the level of premium paid. Too large premiums raise the
stakes for what level of synergy needs to be achieved in order to make the deal a value creating
one. This follows from the synergy hypothesis. It therefore means that if companies overpay,
the markets are likely to punish them more severely in negative abnormal returns compared to
their peers. Damodaran (2005) points out that in order to arrive at the price to pay for a target,
the level of synergies should be the difference between the value of the combined firm and the
sum of the standalone values of both firms discounted at the appropriate rate that highlights the
risk of those synergy cash flows. If the present value of the synergies is less than the premium
paid, then the deal has destroyed value and the market will eventually identify this value loss
and correct itself.
Other factors advanced as determining the level of the premium paid include deal
characteristics such as deal value (Moeller et al, 2004), toehold (percentage of shares held in
the target by the acquirer at announcement (Eckbo, 2009)), level of target hostility (Schwert,
2000), and method of payment (Myers and Majluf, 1984). However, others are of the contrary
view of the benefits of M&A (see Zollo and Meier, 2008). We conclude that since the impact
is not obvious, the effects are subject to empirical validation. Thus, our first hypothesis
considers whether the amount of premium paid has any significant effect on the short run
performance of a firm. Based on the above discussion, we hypothesize in the alternate form:
Hypothesis 1: Premium paid has significant effect on short run performance.
Next, we analyse the data to determine whether quadratic relationship exist between the
premium paid and acquirers’ returns. We consider this association because as expected, if the
premium is too high, we should expect a positive effect, as indicated in the synergy and
6overpayment hypotheses that identify a relationship in the opposite direction. According to the
synergy hypothesis, a higher deal premium could be a sign of great expectation from the merger
and the possibilities of obtaining synergies (Slusky and Caves, 1991). For example, Danone,
the French dairy company that wants to acquire a North America’s firm, White Wave Foods
for $12.5bn, pays about 40 times the target company expected earnings in 2017 (Barber, 2016).
Therefore, our second hypothesis seeks to explore the relationship between premium paid and
returns, and states as:
Hypothesis 2: There is a significant quadratic relationship or synergy between the premium
paid and acquirers’ returns?
Despite the intention of mergers to generate both short and long-term economic values for
shareholders (Ramaswamy and Waegelein 2003), the question, whether it can be sustained past
the short-term prospects, remains elusive. Because managers undertake mergers with multiple
motives in mind (Schweizer, 2005), they see the price paid as the true assessment of the target’s
net worth and thus the short-term event studies may not reflect the full impact of the mergers (
Zollo and Meier, 2008). Therefore, we examine the M&A long-term overall acquisition
performance. Harrison et al. (2005) show that using the short-term event window for M&A
performance evaluation could lead to wrong findings since they are not related to the economic
value from the mergers.
Most studies on M&As have argued that acquiring firms suffer long-term abnormal under-
performance (Doukas and Travlos, 1988; Agrawal and Jaffe, 2000). For example, Datta and
Puia (1995) document significant negative abnormal returns on the US acquiring firms. On the
contrary, other studies critique the view of long-term underperformance of takeovers, and argue
that it is inconsistent with the efficient markets hypothesis (Dutta and Jog, 2009), and the extent
of the impact on stock price depends on the estimation techniques used to measure the return
(Martynovaa and Renneboogb, 2008). A growing number of other empirical studies report
long-term economic values for shareholders following takeovers (e.g., Ben-Amar and Andre,
2006; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008; Eckbo and Thorburn, 2009). For instance, Langetieg
(1978) documents that post-acquisition performance of the acquiring firm is not significantly
different from the control sample. Similarly, Bradley and Jarrell (1988) and Franks et al. (1991)
do not find significant post-acquisition underperformance of the acquiring firm while Rahman
and Limmack (2004) find positive change in long-term operating performance of acquirers of
7Malaysian firms. Also, Kumar and Bansal (2008) focus on India acquiring firms and find a
significant improvement in post-merger profitability. Though Nnadi and Tanna, (2014) have
established that cross border acquisitions create significant loss in shareholder value for the
acquiring banks, and that profitability in the case of domestic mergers is driven by the level of
risks, the long-term effects of M&As are not a priori obvious. The impact can differ across
countries and time. To provide evidence, we examine the long-term effects of post-acquisition
performance on the acquiring firms. Thus, we develop the following hypothesis in the alternate
form:
Hypothesis 3: M&A has significant effect on long-term performance of acquiring firm.
3 Data and methodology
3.1 Sample and data collection
The data on mergers and acquisitions deals on EU firms is obtained from the SDC Platinum of
Thomson Financial Securities Data Worldwide Mergers and Acquisitions Database. In
obtaining the data, we apply the following criteria:
• Time period: From 2000 to 2013. This period was chosen to cover the gap in existing
literature on this topic, it includes the period of the most recent financial crisis, and
ensures we have up to three years post-acquisition performance information as at the
research date.
• Markets: The focus of this research is the European market. We have restricted the
sample to deals involving acquirers and acquisition targets domiciled in this region.
• Public status: To ensure we obtain company specific information on both acquirer and
target, the sample is restricted to public companies in which the offer price is not
missing. We also restricted the sample to those transactions in which the acquirer
crossed the 50% shareholding threshold in consummating the transaction.
• Deals and deal size: We only include completed deals. To reduce the impact of noise
in the sample, we restrict the deals obtained to those with value exceeding $5 million
threshold.
• Exclusions: Following Fama and French (1992), we exclude financial firms and utilities
due to the impact of regulation and other peculiarities within these industries. We also
exclude cross-border takeovers except if it is within the EU, and deals classified by
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Further, we exclude sample if the bidding and target firms do not have accounting data
available for at least one year prior to takeover.
Our stock return and accounting data was collected from DataStream database. Our final
sample consists of 725 mergers and acquisitions transactions from 19 European countries over
the period 2000–2013 was obtained applying these standard selection criteria.
3.2 Methodology
For our short-term analysis of the effect of premium on firm performance post-acquisition, we
adopt the notion that stock prices reflect the amount of private information impounded into it
through informed trading by arbitragers. As stock market participants obtain new and valuable
information about the acquisition and appraise the firm’s performance around the occurrence
of the merger, it will reflect on the stock returns for the acquiring firm (e.g., see Gubbi et al.,
2010; Morck et al., 2000), and this can be used to determine the abnormal return around the
announcement day. Thus, we employ the event study method because it reflects stock market
responses to the unexpected announced event (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997).
In order to analyse the responses of the market participants to the announcements, we compute
the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over an event window following Brown and Warner
(1985), defined as:
      =       
   
… … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . … … … … … … … . . (1)
where      = 	     −     
    is the actual return of the sample firm Ri at time t and      is the expected return for that firm
in time, t. Fama (1998) highlights that given the assumption of efficient markets, the abnormal
returns for firms should be zero. The efficient markets hypothesis also assumes that prices
adjust rapidly to any change in information. Hence, in response to a merger or acquisition
announcement, we expect the prices of the securities to adjust rapidly to the new information.
To measure the short-term market reactions to the proposed deal, we use the three-day and
five-day event windows and the market model to estimate the CARs. The abnormal returns are
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acquiring company is obtained by regressing the returns of the company on the returns of the
market over the event window t-360 to t-60 (calendar days). In order to sidestep the possibility
of carrying over past abnormal results into the event window, estimated returns are obtained
by multiplying the derived beta by the market return. To test our first hypothesis, we run the
following regression model for the three-day and five-day event window:
    = 	  + ∅ + 	          +      	   	       +              +      	      	  	    	 +
     	   +      	     	  +      	     	   		 +         +      	      	  	     +
	      	   	           + 	      	   	       +       ℎ          	      +
		              + 	 		 (2)
In the model, CAR is our abnormal returns from equation (1),   is the intercept and ∅ is fixed
firm effects. Following Ahern et al. (2015), we compute premium as the transaction value
reported by SDC divided by the market value of the target four weeks before the announcement
date. Following existing research, we include several controls variables designed to mitigate
potentially confounding factors known to affect the acquisition performance. We control for
firm size of target (Asquith et al., 1983), acquirer firm size, (Morck et al., 1990), tender offers
(Rau and Vermaelen, 1998), market to book ratio for acquirer and target firm (Laamanen,
2007). We control for transaction value, past year stock return and return volatility, and
country’s size using natural logarithm of GDP (Ahern et al., 2015). We control for high
premium transactions via dummy variable that equals 1 if the premium is higher than the
median premium of the target return on assets, or 0 if otherwise (Kisgen et al., 2009). The
variables are fully defined in Appendix 1.
Diaz, Azofra and Guiterrez (2009) explore banking takeovers in Europe and found a quadratic
relationship between deals premiums and bidder returns. Their findings indicate that up to a
threshold of 21%, the premium has a positive impact on the returns and with premium proxying
for anticipated synergies, a finding consistent with Antoniou et al (2008). It is the goal of this
paper to shed light on the impact, if any, of premiums paid on subsequent performance, using
this quadratic approach. The existing literature on the link between premiums and subsequent
performance remains relatively scanty compared to for example, the determinants of the
takeover premium. This research seeks to provide a robust look into the nature of the
relationship between deal premiums and post-acquisition performance in the EU. We include
10
premium squared in the model (Eq. 3) to ascertain if a quadratic relationship exists between
premium and returns.
Therefore, in our second hypothesis, to explore the existence of the nonlinearity relationship
between the deal premium and performance, we follow Diaz et al. (2009) model and use the
quadratic regression approach:
    = 	  + ∅ + 	          +            + ∑      + 	  (3)
where the maximum of the premium is estimated as:
        
        
= 	    + 2          = 0 (4)
        =   
	 ∗  
(5)
Where: the dependent variable for (3), CAR, represents the cumulative abnormal return of the
acquiring company for the [-1;+1] and [-2;+2] and our main independent variable, Premium, is
as defined in equation (2). Xn is the vector of control variables in equation (2). Premium2 is a
variable that captures the quadratic relationship between both variables and the dependent
variable as defined in equation (2), often referred to as inverted “U-shapes” functional form in
literature. From equation (5), we expect the relationship between the bidder’s return and deal
premium (that is, the point of inflection) to be convex, that is    < 0	   	   > 0.
Next, we evaluate the post-merger performance using the calendar-time portfolio approach.
This approach overcomes some of the problems associated with event study methods (Mitchell
and Stafford, 2000) and a widely accepted approach for measuring the abnormal performance
of firms (e.g., Comer et al., 2009; Morse et al, 2011). It has been well documented that stock
prices ‘fully incorporate’ all available information (e.g., Bai et al., 2016), which include for the
bidding firms, the deal premium. Thus, we use the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, an
extension of Fama and French (1993) three-factor model to estimate the abnormal returns for
the long-term net performance of the mergers because it explains a major portion of the
variation in equity returns (for example, Artman et al., 2012). Hence, for every observation, we
obtain the returns,    , from DataStream database which are then used in the 4-factor equation
(3) below to estimate the abnormal return.
    −     =    +        −      +        + ℎ      + ℎ      +     (6)
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Here, for each day	 ,     − 	    is the excess return of the test stock,     −     is the market
portfolio excess return,      is the size premium return factor,      is the value premium
return factor, WML equals the earning premium (momentum factor) as calculated by French
(2016),    is the intercept of the model which represents the abnormal performance earned by
manager, and     is the stochastic error term.
4. Empirical tests and results
In this section, we present empirical evidence on the effects of the deal premium on the bidding
firms’ performance.
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of our final sample by countries (Panel A) and across
time (Panel B). The United Kingdom remains the country with the highest number of acquirers
over the sample period with 230 reported acquisitions. The UK and France are the highest-
volume acquirer countries (50% of deals) while Hungary, Lithuania and Luxembourg are the
least-volume acquirer countries (less than 1%). France and the UK also reported a combined
transaction value of $327m (around 47%) over the sample period. Table 1 also shows that there
is no major difference in the mode of payment, and around 46% of the transactions are financed
by using cash only. The literature suggests that more stock are used during periods of high
market valuation, otherwise cash is used. As column (4) indicates, the deal premium for
mergers in Lithuania and Luxembourg are 100% higher than the sample median while in
Netherlands, it is 69% higher than the sample premium. Hungary, Portugal, and Greece
recorded the lowest deal premium paid below the sample mean in our sample period.
Panel B of Table 1 summaries the transactions in Europe by year. The table shows that
acquisitions in Europe follow the same wave patterns of M&A activity globally (Alexandridis
et al, 2012). M&A activities declined in 2001 due to the Dot-com crash of summer 2000, but
gradually build-up and reached a record high in 2006 (see Alexandridis et al., 2012). The
financial crisis of 2007 also led to progressive decline in the number of M&A transactions in
the intervening years.
[Insert Table 1 here]
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Figure 1 indicates the relationship between percentage of premium and the number of M&A
deals. Between year 2000 and 2006, it indicates that as number of deals rises, the premiums
tend to rise and vice versa. The year 2000 has the highest number of deals in the figure which
corresponds to the highest median premium observed in our sample. High median premiums
are identified in the years of high market valuation and bubbles - 2000 and 2007. It appears
that although the financial crisis started to affect merger activities in late 2007, the impact was
felt the following year as the median premiums declined in 2008 to 21% and fluctuates between
20% and 25% in year 2009 to 2013. Such evidence supports the merger wave hypothesis of
acquisition activity and justifies the inclusion of year dummies in the regression models
investigating the relationship between premiums and post-acquisition performance.
4.2 The effects of premiums and post-merger performance using the short-term event
window
In this section, we examine the association of the impact of deals premium on the bidding firm
performance after the merger. Using the market model, the 3- and 5- day CARs are analysed.
Table 2 presents our primary results of the regression analyses.
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From the results in column (1), the 3-Day cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) without the
fixed year effects is negative (β1 =-0.184) and statistically significant at the 10% level, and in
column (2), the results with the fixed year and firm effects is negative (β1 =-0.185) and
statistically significant at the 10% level. The results indicate that the premium paid has
significant negative effect on the abnormal returns. In columns (3) and (4), using the 5-Day
CARs as dependent variables, the results are not statistically significant. The results show that,
on average, takeover of listed firms in the EU generates negative response from investors by
producing negative abnormal returns to the bidding firms’ shareholders. As shown from
columns (1) to (4), the 5-Day [-2;+2] event is not significant but the 3-Day event window [-
1;+1] is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that the arrival of new information
allow investors to glean previously unavailable information, improving their investment
decisions and informational efficiency of the capital markets. In addition, we find that high
premium paying acquirers have a positive but insignificant CARs in the short window. In sum,
the findings of the 3-Day regression results support hypothesis H1, which predict a negative
association between premium paid and the bidding firm performance.
[Insert Table 2 here]
4.3 Do mergers driven by higher premium generate synergies for the bidders?
As discussed above, evidence suggests that the high premium paid by the acquirer generates
negative response from shareholders and proxy for overpayment in takeovers, because as
Dutordoir et al. (2014) argued, investors perceive that managers lack precise information to
obtain accurate analysis of target synergy benefits. However, this association could be subject
to size of the premium (see for example, Fu et al., 2013; Palia, 1993; Ruback, 1982). As the
premium increases, investors could consider higher premium as evidence of higher synergy.
Therefore, to test hypothesis H2, we analyse whether the magnitude of premium paid could
influence the acquiring company’s abnormal returns using a quadratic relationship.
Table 3 shows the results obtained from our regression analysis examining any quadratic
relationship between the premium paid and acquirers’ abnormal returns in the short run. It is
observed in column (1) that the coefficient for Premium is negative and statistically significant
at the 5% level and the coefficient of Premium2 shows a significant positive association with
abnormal returns at the 10% level. The findings confirm the existence of quadratic relation, but
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subject to the size of the premium. The coefficient of Premium is negative, supporting the
overpayment hypothesis and suggesting that market participants consider acquisition as a
value-destroying deal (Diaz et al., 2009; Mueller and Sirower, 2003). On the contrary, when
the deal premium is very high, it has an insignificant but positive effect on the acquiring firm
in line with the synergy hypothesis. The findings show that investors expect firms to be willing
to pay above-average premiums for firms with relatively higher investment opportunities or for
a special company that will help the acquiring company to get ahead of competitors such as
through the realization of production and distribution economies. Ruback (1982) argues that a
target firm that creates value should have several bidding firms competing for takeover and
thus the acquiring firm will need to pay excessive high premium.
Next, analysing the quadratic relationship using the coefficients from Table 3 in column (1)
and (2) on equation 5, the point of inflection should be between 3.01 (i.e, -0.428/(2*0.071))
and 3.18 (i.e., -0.414/(2*0.065)). Given that β2 is positive in our estimates, these points
represent the minimum. Taken at face value, these findings strongly suggest that investors will
consider acquisition a value creating investment opportunity with substantial degree of
synergies if the bidding firm pays above 2.01 to 2.18 times the average deal premium
respectively, thus reflecting the effect of synergy hypothesis.
[Insert Table 3 here]
In columns (3) and (4) of Table 3, using the 5-Day abnormal return shows the regression results
are not statistically significant. This suggests that lower information quality could affect stock
prices leading to misvaluation of investments. In summary, using stock abnormal returns as
proxy for post-acquisition value creation, the 3-Day regression results support our hypothesis
H2 that there is a significant positive quadratic relationship between the premium paid and firm
performance for the acquiring firm, suggesting synergy hypothesis. Further, these finding of
the 3-Day and 5-Day also supports the notion of stock price informativeness, that the stock
price reflects the amount of firm-specific information impounded into it.
4.4 The effects of merger on the long-term performance of acquiring firm using the Calendar-
time portfolio approach
In this section, we analyse the effect of takeovers on the bidder’s long-term performance using
the Calendar-time portfolio approach used in prior studies (e.g., Dutta and Jog, 2009). To
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compute long run returns, we use the Carhart (1997) four-factor model to estimate the Alpha
over the post deal completion. The CARs of each firm are regressed against the market
premium, size and book to market factors over the respective months.
[Insert Table 4 here]
Table 4 reports the results of the calendar-time four-factor regression model. For the 12 months
period, we observe a negative Alpha for the 2000-2013 period. The Alpha for the 12 months is
negative and statistically significant =0.35% per month, with a t-statistic of 5.95, though the
abnormal returns are significantly below zero. Similarly, the intercept for the regression using
the 24 months returns is negative and statistically significant (β=-0.0014, or -0.14%). 
Therefore, our result shows underperformance of EU acquiring firms although the evidence
from this analysis are barely below zero. The results are similar using the 36 months and 60
months returns. Therefore, our results show the long-term underperformance for EU acquiring
firm and strengthens the inference from our findings that the EU acquiring firms are likely to
result in long-term underperformance.
This finding is consistent with our short-term analysis. The coefficients of the SMB and HML
factors are negative and are statistically significantly for most of the period. A negative
coefficient of SMB implies that the average size of bidding firms is quite large while negative
coefficient of HML suggests that the sample firms are high growth firms with higher price-to-
book ratio and the positive coefficient of WML signifies that the sample firms past returns are
marginally higher. The overall model fit is considerably lower (the largest adjusted R2 = 0.09).
Collectively, by using both the short and long-term event window, we find strong support for
the acquiring firm underperformance post-acquisition.
5 Conclusion
This study test three hypotheses which include whether premium paid has significant effect on
the short run performance of the acquirers; examining if there is a significant quadratic
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relationship or synergy between the premium paid and the acquirers returns, and finally
whether M&As have significant effect on the long run performance of acquiring firms. The
result of the first hypothesis shows that premium has a negative effect on the abnormal returns
of acquirers. In our second hypothesis, the coefficient of premium is negative which supports
the overpayment hypothesis and suggests that the market considers such acquisitions as value
destroying. However, the premium2 has a positive and significant relationship with the CARs
indicating existence of a quadratic relationship which also supports the synergy hypothesis.
The result from our last hypothesis confirms that in the long run, European firms underperform
following mergers and acquisition.
Our findings reveal that, in the short term, premiums have a negative quadratic relationship
with abnormal returns and but a positive relationship in the long-term. Hence, in the short term,
returns show a negative relationship with premium paid until a premium level of 2.01 times the
average premium is reached. The overpayment hypothesis holds true until the 2.01 times the
average premium mark is attained, after which the synergy hypothesis comes into play. Our
result also confirms underperformance of acquirers after the merger.
These results are robust to several deal and firm specific characteristics. In this paper, we
provides empirical evidence that as far as announcement period and long run post acquisition
performance are concerned, premiums play a significant role in explaining the results obtained.
The results do not necessarily imply causality but point to strong relationships between the
variables. Low premium acquirers have an advantage as higher premiums paid creates a
“hurdle” to cross; an extra motivation to actualise the synergies underpinning the premiums
paid and this may invariably lead to their better performance.
The implication of these findings is that companies engaging in acquisitions need not worry
about paying significant premiums if they can be certain of generating the synergies to justify
the level of premium paid. In the same way as debt levels act as a hurdle to spur managers to
deliver sufficient profits to meet interest and principal repayments, high premiums seem to act
as a prod to managers of the acquiring company to deliver value in excess of the premium paid.
Companies focusing on short run returns can offer significant premiums to excite the market
about the synergies they think they can glean from the mergers. They would do well to
remember that in the years following the acquisition, any failure to deliver on those forecasted
synergies would be punished by the market though the operational cost efficiency and capital
strength of acquirers are significant in influencing excess returns (Nnadi and Tanna, 2013).
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On the other hand, low premium acquirers while suffering only modest losses relative to peers
in the announcement period must find the “motivation” to deliver synergy values beyond what
their high premium counterparts would have done. The results show that they underperform
their high premium paying counterparts and our study shows that high premium paying
acquirers have an extra incentive, due to the level of premium already given to the target, to
get back that value in synergies. Low premium acquirers must therefore benchmark against
their high premium counterparts and seek to deliver similar levels of synergies. Only then can
they argue to have preserved value over the short and long terms.
Taken together, the results obtained in the study show the need for more research on the impact
of premium on post mergers and acquisitions using real accounting information. It would be
interesting to analyse the impact of deal premium overpayment on corporate governance in the
long term.
Appendix
Variable definition
Variable Definition
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Acq Market to Book This is the ratio of acquirer market-to-book value of equity the 12
months prior to the announcement month (Source: DataStream).
Acq Tobin Q Acquirer Tobin’ q is measured as the market value (MV) of equity
less the book value (BV) of equity, plus the book value of assets,
all scaled by the book value of assets 12 months prior to the
announcement month (Source: DataStream).
Acq Ttl Assets The natural logarithm of total assets of acquirer (Source:
DataStream).
CAR This is a 3-day or 5-day abnormal market returns around earnings
announcement date estimated by using the market model (Source:
DataStream).
HighLowpremium Dummy Dummy variable equal to one if premium is higher than the
median premium and zero otherwiseAcq Rtn Volatility Acquirer Stock return volatility in the 12 months prior to the
announcement (Source: DataStream).
Premium2 is a variable that captures the quadratic relationship between
premium and CARAcq Stock Rtn Acquirer Stock return in the 12 months prior to the announcement
month (Source: DataStream).LnGDP Natural logarithm of annual Gross Domestic Product (Source:
World Development Indicators).Premium Premium calculated as the transaction value reported by SDC
divided by the market value of the target four weeks before the
announcement date (Ahern et al., 2015).Tgt Market to Book This is the ratio of target firm market-to-book value of equity the
12 months prior to the announcement month (Source:
DataStream).Tgt ROA Target firm net income before the extraordinary items scaled by
total assets in the 12 months prior to the announcement month
(Source: DataStream).Tgt Ttl Assets The natural logarithm total assets of target firm (Source:
DataStream).TransValue The dollar value of all consideration paid in a merger (Source:
SDC).YearDummies Assigned dummy variables for each year to control for time
effects.
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Table 1 (Panel A): Summary statistics: Sorted by country
The sample consists of acquisitions taking place by European acquirers between 2000 and
2013. Premium is computed as the difference between the initial offer price and the target
market price four weeks before the announcement date divided by the target market price four
weeks before the announcement. Cash and Stock represent the number of deals with each
25
method. Hybrid means a combination of cash and stock. High premium is where the
transaction value reported by SDC is higher than the market value of the target, four weeks
before the announcement date.
Form of payment
Acquirer Country
No.
of
Deals
Average
Premium (%)
High
Premium Cash Stock Hybrid
Transaction
value ($m)
Austria 9 20 4 7 2 0 6,529
Belgium 17 24 13 9 5 4 26,278
Finland 19 31 11 10 4 5 5,415
France 132 27 95 67 36 37 168,394
Germany 55 21 33 35 12 9 57,812
Greece 15 12 8 6 8 4 7,692
Hungary 1 10 1 1 0 0 242
Ireland 7 28 4 1 4 2 1,698
Italy 37 24 20 16 10 12 58,255
Lithuania 1 67 1 0 1 0 180
Luxembourg 1 50 1 1 0 1 447
Netherlands 29 40 22 19 5 4 30,045
Norway 31 22 20 16 8 9 19,454
Poland 11 17 6 4 3 6 2,292
Portugal 3 6 3 3 0 0 644
Spain 33 15 21 14 18 5 69,046
Sweden 58 58 49 31 19 18 24,699
Switzerland 36 28 24 24 9 4 60,230
United Kingdom 230 32 178 118 70 61 158,777
Total 725 30 514 382 214 181 698,129
Table 1 (Panel B): Summary statistics: Sorted by time period
The sample consists of acquisitions taking place by European acquirers between 2000 and 2013.
Premium is computed as the difference between the initial offer price and the target market price
four weeks before the announcement date divided by the target market price four weeks before the
announcement. Cash and Stock represent the number of deals with each method. Hybrid means a
26
combination of cash and stock. High premium is where the transaction value reported by SDC is
higher than the market value of the target, four weeks before the announcement date.
Means of Payment
Acquirer
Date
No. of
Deals
Average
Premium (%)
High
Premium Cash Stock Hybrid
Transaction
value ($m)
2000 130 35 81 63 41 26 113,233
2001 60 23 30 28 14 18 38,480
2002 51 28 27 26 12 13 42,424
2003 47 55 21 16 18 13 35,167
2004 47 16 14 23 11 13 47,151
2005 59 22 27 23 24 12 75,702
2006 79 19 30 35 24 20 93,717
2007 76 31 41 37 16 23 105,981
2008 38 26 18 18 9 11 30,394
2009 35 33 18 14 17 4 7,941
2010 28 22 15 13 6 9 27,183
2011 30 28 17 14 7 9 21,101
2012 23 37 11 9 9 5 28,077
2013 22 31 13 11 6 5 31,579
Total 725 29 363 330 214 181 698,129
Table 2: The effect of deal premium on post-merger performance of bidding firms
This table reports deal premium on firm performance post-acquisition. The dependent variables are
cumulative abnormal returns for 3-Day (columns (1) and (2)) and 5-Day (columns (3) and (4)) event
window . All variables (except High/Low premium dummy variable) are truncated at the 1st and 99th
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percentile. We include year and fixed effects to control for any fundamental differences in premium and
controls across time. Estimated standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm
level. Statistically significance denoted as ***, **, and * for 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (using a two-
sided test).
1 2 3 4
3-Day CAR 3-Day CAR 5-Day CAR 5-Day CAR
Premium -0.184* -0.185* -0.102 -0.101
[-1.77] [-1.67] [-0.80] [-0.80]
Acq Market-to-Book 0.079 0.093 -0.147 -0.216
[0.33] [0.53] [-0.68] [-0.90]
Tgt Market-to-Book -0.015 -0.050 0.006 0.003
[-0.17] [-0.58] [0.05] [0.03]
Ln(Acq Total Assets) 0.001 0.322* -0.155 -0.161
[0.01] [1.76] [-1.26] [-0.83]
Ln(Tgt Total Assets) -0.058 -0.069 -0.035 -0.034
[-0.78] [-1.08] [-0.49] [-0.50]
Ln(Transaction Value) 0.083 0.053 0.031 0.020
[1.08] [0.77] [0.50] [0.33]
Tgt ROA -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.000
[-0.31] [-0.64] [-0.18] [0.05]
High/Low premium 0.053 0.058 0.145 0.137
[0.49] [0.52] [0.98] [0.93]
Ln(Acq Past year return) 0.03 -0.105 -0.121 -0.143
[0.20] [-0.68] [-0.56] [-0.58]
Ln(Acq Past year return
volatility) 0.252 0.346 -0.329 -0.166
[0.53] [0.59] [-0.54] [-0.27]
Acq Tobin Q -0.181 -0.244 -0.022 -0.098
[-0.72] [-1.01] [-0.07] [-0.35]
Ln(GDP) -1.429 -2.556 -0.691 -1.172
[-0.52] [-0.89] [-0.18] [-0.32]
Constant 6.86 8.152 5.897 8.548
[0.51] [0.62] [0.33] [0.50]
Number of observations 707 707 707 707
Adj. R-squared (%) 1.1 16.5 3.4 12.7
Year fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3: Relationship between the premium paid and acquirers’ returns
This table reports whether a quadratic relationship exists between the premium paid and
acquirers’ returns using deal premium on firm performance post-acquisition. The dependent
variables are cumulative abnormal returns for 3-Day (columns (1) and (2)) and 5-Day (columns (3)
and (4)) event window. All variables (except High/Low premium dummy variable) are truncated at
the 1st and 99th percentile. We include year and fixed effects to control for any fundamental
differences in premium and controls across time. Estimated standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. Statistically significance denoted as ***, **, and *
for 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (using a two-sided test).
1 2 3 4
3-Day CAR 3-Day CAR 5-Day CAR 5-Day CAR
Premium -0.428** -0.414** 0.162 0.204
[-2.22] [-2.03] [0.53] [0.70]
Premium Square 0.071* 0.065* -0.077 -0.087
[1.87] [1.67] [-1.23] [-1.41]
Acq Market-to-Book 0.093 0.107 -0.162 -0.234
[0.39] [0.6] [-0.74] [-0.98]
Tgt Market-to-Book -0.037 -0.068 0.029 0.027
[-0.4] [-0.76] [0.23] [0.22]
Ln(Acq Total Assets) -0.001 0.321* -0.152 -0.159
[-0.01] [1.76] [-1.23] [-0.83]
Ln(Tgt Total Assets) -0.089 -0.098 -0.001 0.005
[-1.15] [-1.41] [-0.01] [0.06]
Ln(Transaction Value) 0.12 0.087 -0.009 -0.026
[1.53] [1.2] [-0.12] [-0.36]
Tgt ROA -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.000
[-0.37] [-0.67] [-0.14] [0.08]
High/Low premium 0.087 0.091 0.108 0.093
[0.78] [0.78] [0.70] [0.60]
Ln(Acq Past year return) 0.03 -0.103 -0.122 -0.146
[0.2] [-0.67] [-0.57] [-0.60]
Ln(Acq Past year return volatility) 0.261 0.343 -0.339 -0.161
[0.54] [0.58] [-0.56] [-0.27]
Acq Tobin Q -0.195 -0.248 -0.006 -0.092
[-0.77] [-1.04] [-0.02] [-0.33]
Ln(GDP) -1.125 -2.211 -1.02 -1.634
[-0.41] [-0.77] [-0.26] [-0.44]
Constant 5.558 6.631 7.305 10.58
[0.41] [0.50] [0.40] [0.60]
Number of observations 707 707 707 707
Adj. R-squared (%) 2.0 17.3 4.0 13.7
Year fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 4: Calendar-time portfolio regression using the Carhart four-factor model
Factor Model Characteristics
Alpha RMRF SMB HML WML Adj. R square F-stat Sig.
12 Months
Beta -0.0035 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0002
t-Statistics -5.95 5.78 -2.11 -3.44 7.03 0.0325 18.76 0.00
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.035 0.001 0.000
24 Months
Beta -0.0014 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0001 0.0001
t-Statistics -3.24 4.62 -7.16 -1.68 4.01 0.0604 19.93 0.00
Sig. 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.092 0.000
36 Months
Beta -0.0024 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0000 0.0001
t-Statistics -6.42 5.21 -5.27 -0.93 4.35 0.0742 14.19 0.00
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.351 0.000
60 Months
Beta -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
t-Statistics -5.74 1.02 -2.99 -1.81 0.34 0.0935 4.30 0.00
Sig. 0.000 0.306 0.003 0.071 0.731
This table presents the regression results for the Carhart four-factor model following the acquisition. RMRF is the difference between monthly
stock return portfolio and risk-free rate. SMB, HML and WML are from the Kenneth French website, available at
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html
